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This thesis addresses why some African leaders have succeeded in extending their 
mandates while others have not. Specifically, the study focuses on societal factors that 
impose constraints upon leaders attempting to extend or abolish term limits, paying 
particular attention to the influence of urbanization, formal education, and the functioning 
of civil society organizations. Using a within-case methodology, the study investigates 
Blaise Compaore’s twenty-seven-year rule in Burkina Faso, comparing his successful 
extension of his mandate in 2005 to his failed attempt in 2014. Comparative case analysis 
is used to determine what societal changes may have occurred between the two attempts. 
The analysis suggests that urbanization and the functioning of civil society organizations 
were factors important to the difference in outcomes. The factor of formalized education 
was not found to be important. In 2014, new grassroots, pro-democratic civil society 
organizations capitalized on urban demographic changes to mobilize pro-democracy 
opposition to Compaore. The organizations used a number of effective strategies to 
accomplish this, including civic education and pro-democracy consensus building. These 
insights offer potential guidance to democracy promoters as they search for opportunities 
to assist pro-democracy civil society organizations. 
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I. OVERVIEW 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Since the rise of electoral political regimes in sub-Saharan Africa in the early 
1990s, many chief executives have sought to amend their countries’ constitutions to 
extend their time in office. To date, the majority of these attempts have been successful. 
This thesis aims to contribute to the emerging literature on this phenomenon by analyzing 
societal factors that affect a leader’s success or failure in extending or abolishing term 
limits. 
The impact of three societal factors—urbanization, education and the functioning 
of civil society organizations—is investigated and assessed within the context of a single 
country, Burkina Faso, whose president, Blaise Compaore, twice attempted to extend his 
term. Urbanization and the functioning of civil society organizations were found to be 
most important for understanding why Compaore was successful in his first attempt but 
failed in his most recent attempt in 2014, and was ultimately overthrown. While the 
impact of formal education levels was less significant overall, there was a clear 
importance of increased civic education in mobilizing and uniting protesters.  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), in its 2017 Posture Statement, 
posits democracy strengthening as a key objective on the continent.1 Research indicates a 
crucial vehicle for promoting democracy in African countries is the provision for term 
limits within their constitutions.2 The United States and its allies, as well as numerous 
ideologically aligned NGOs, hold that African leaders must respect constitutionally 
mandated term limits because turnover of power is a key ingredient in what is known as 
                                                 
1 Africa Command, “AFRICOM 2017 Posture Statement,” accessed October 15, 2016, 
www.africom/mil/media-room/document 28720/africom-2017posture-statement.  
2 Daniel N. Posner and Daniel J. Young, “Term Limits and the Transfer of Power,” December 2016, 
http://danielnposner.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Posner-Young-chapter-161205-distrib.pdf.  
2 
“democratic consolidation”: the task of making a young democracy secure and durable.3 
Posner and Young write that knowing when one will relinquish power is perhaps the best 
way to constrain African leaders wishing to hold onto it.4 When leaders hold onto power 
for long periods, it prevents the democracy from consolidating. Dimitru and Hayat note 
that non-consolidated democracies are more vulnerable to setbacks.5 Prolonged power 
without accountability allows for corruption, entrenchment of patronage networks, 
personal enrichment of the leader at the expense of the people, and numerous other 
abuses that lead to political violence. Wilmot writes that term limits are viewed as a 
“powerful antidote” to such problems because they decrease barriers to political 
participation, something she describes as a key element of democracy.6  
Attempts by African leaders to extend or abolish term limits mandated in their 
constitutions are a relatively new phenomenon. Much of the literature on term limits in 
Africa focuses on the incentives leaders’ face in adhering to or challenging term limits. In 
contrast, this investigation emphasizes the important role of societal factors, particularly 
demographic factors and changes in civil society, in influencing the outcome of contests 
over term limits. Factors identified from the study of Burkina Faso will be useful in 
assessing the likelihood of a leader’s success or failure in other African countries and 
understanding when and why term limits are more likely to prevail.  
                                                 
3 Andreas Schedler, “What is Democratic Consolidation?” Project Muse 9, no. 2 (1998): 91, doi: 
10.1353/jod.1998.0030.  
4 Posner and Young, “Term Limits.”  
5 Alexandra Dimitru and Raphie Hayat, Sub-Saharan Africa: Politically More Stable, but Still Fragile 
(Utrecht, The Netherlands: Rabobank Economic Research, 2015), 
https://economics.rabobank.com/publications/ 
2015/december/sub-saharan-africa-politically-more-stable-but-still-fragile/.  
6 Claire Wilmot, “How and Why Term Limits Matter,” African Arguments, October 5, 2015, 
http://africanarguments.org/2015/10/05/how-and-why-term-limits-matter/.  
3 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Background: The Phenomenon of Term Limit Change 
Thirty-three of forty-eight post-Cold War constitutions in sub-Saharan Africa 
contained term limits for presidents, typically two terms.7 At the time the constitutions 
were ratified, these countries had little experience with democracy, and their level of 
commitment to this form of government was unclear. As leaders approached term limits, 
some of them began looking for ways to extend their stays in office and, more often than 
not, have succeeded in amending their constitutions to extend or abolish term limits. 
Between 1990 and 2015, leaders of sixteen countries sought to amend two-term limit 
clauses in their respective constitutions; eleven of those attempts have been successful 
and at least two more are promising success by the end of 2017.8 
Between 1960 and 1980, following independence from European colonial rule, 
African leaders were often described as “big men” or “strong men.” Operating in what 
Dulani describes as a “culture of personal rule,” some leaders in these regimes acted 
largely with impunity, relying on entrenched power, often amassing great personal wealth 
and creating systems of patronage that helped ensure their continued rule.9 Civil strife 
was widespread during this period and transitions of power during this period were 
largely the result of military coups.10  
During the Cold War, these authoritarian regimes continued. However, at the end 
of the Cold War and through the mid-1990s, many African states adopted systems of 
government resembling those of Western democracies. These efforts to install democratic 
regimes were a result both of encouragement from primarily Western donors who, in 
                                                 
7 Dimitru and Hayat, Sub-Saharan Africa.  
8 Posner and Young, “Term Limits.”  
9 Boniface Madalitso Dulani, “Personal Rule and Presidential Term Limits in Africa” (PhD. Diss., 
Michigan State University, 2011), 
http://etd.lib.msu.edu/islandora/object/etd%3A1526/datastream/OBJ/view.  
10 Dimitru and Hayat, Sub-Saharan Africa.  
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some cases, now contributed substantial portions of some state budgets,11 and pressure 
from within a county’s own population.12 Bratton and Van de Walle describe this opening 
of authoritarian regimes as a “break welcomed by … African citizens eager to exercise 
long denied civil rights.”13 Countries ratified constitutions and began to hold elections. 
Some countries adopted and sustained liberal institutions. Some have thwarted their 
presidents’ attempts to amend the constitution to extend term limits. In Zambia in 2001, 
for example, President Frederick Chiluba faced a divide on the issue within his own 
ruling party, and was therefore not able to get the amendment through parliament even 
though his own party dominated parliament.14 In Malawi in 2002, when President Bakili 
Mulizi introduced an amendment to allow him to run for a third term, the amendment did 
not pass in the rarer circumstance that the president’s party held less than 50% of seats in 
the national legislature. In the end, Mulizi was not popular enough with the coalition 
government to effect a change in the two-term limit.15 In both cases, the consolidation of 
democratic institutions had undermined each president’s power to unilaterally influence 
political outcomes and was, therefore, indicated a stronger democracy. Other countries, 
however, despite having constitutions and the appearance of democracy, have continued 
various forms of autocratic rule.16 In some countries, leaders have been successful in 
holding on to power even in the presence of multi-party elections and other democratic 
norms.17 
                                                 
11 Ionel Zamfir, Democracy in Africa: Power Alternation and Presidential Term Limits (Briefing 
PE580.880) (London: European Parliamentary Research Service, 2016), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2016)580880.  
12 Michael Bratton and Nicholas van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions 
in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), xiii.  
13 Ibid.  
14 Daniel Vencovsky, “Presidential Term Limits,” Conflict Trends (April 2007): 15–21, 
http://www.accord.org.za/publication/conflict-trends-2007-2/?wpv_view_count=15871-
TCPID563&wpv_paged=3.  
15 Ibid.  
16 Zamfir, Democracy in Africa.  
17 Alexander Baturo, Democracy, Dictatorship, and Term Limits (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 2014).  
5 
Baturo writes that leaders who attempt to extend their mandates display 
“constitutional imagination” by using a variety of approaches to accomplish that goal.18 
Democratic Digest, an online source providing news and analysis on democracy 
assistance, identifies four tactics commonly used by leaders in their attempts to extend or 
abolish term limits.19 Some leaders simply argue that because they were already in power 
when term limits were instituted, the limits do not apply to them retroactively. For 
example, in Equatorial Guinea and Angola, countries with two-term limits instituted 
during their presidents’ first terms, leaders argued they were entitled to run for a third 
term because the first one did not count against the limit. A second tactic, used by leaders 
in Cameroon, Algeria, Uganda, Djibouti and Togo, is called the “Legislative Assist” in 
which the leader removes term limits with the approval of parliament. In these instances, 
there is often abuse of the democratic process in that the leader’s party is in control of 
parliament and part of the leader’s network of patronage. Additionally, the president may 
bribe or intimidate legislators outside of his patronage network. Similar to the 
“Legislative Assist,” a third tactic used is “The Art of the Referendum.”20 Leaders 
turning to referendums to extend their rule include those of Chad and Republic of Congo. 
In some cases, these referendums are anything but democratic. Referendums are rigged in 
any number of ways: bribery, coercion, intimidation, voter registration fraud, and 
discriminatory access to polling places.21 The fourth tactic, the “Kitchen Sink Approach” 
has been used in Rwanda and Burundi.22 When one tactic does not work or seems 
inadequate, leaders have used combinations of strategies in order to attempt to extend 
their stays in office.  
Some scholars see a positive aspect to these mandate extensions in that they have 
usually been accomplished through institutional means rather than by the president 
                                                 
18 Ibid.  
19 Elen Aghekyan, “Autocrats Bag of Tricks for Staying in Power,” Democratic Digest, February 12, 
2016, http://www.demdigest.net/tag/autocrats/.  
20 Ibid.  
21 Anneke Van Woudenberg and Ida Sawyer, “Africa’s Softer, Gentler Coups d’Etat,” Foreign Policy, 
November 3, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/03/africas-softer-gentler-coups-detat/.  
22 Aghekyan, “Autocrats Bag of Tricks.”  
6 
abolishing the entire constitution or openly resorting to violence. McKie notes that in 
virtually every case, leaders “evade term limits through legal channels,” following the 
law while circumventing the intent of the constitution.23 Whether by a legislative vote, a 
popular referendum, or a court’s interpretive decision, the president simply attempts to 
change the portion of the constitution regarding term limits.  
A review of the literature reveals four sources of influence that may impact 
whether leaders can be successful in amending term limit provisions. For purposes of 
discussion, I organize existing explanations into the following broad and somewhat 
overlapping categories: 
1. Governmental factors—having to do with the structure and functioning of 
the government, governmental constraints on leaders, and the motivations 
of the leaders themselves. 
2. Societal factors—regarding the strength of social organizations, formal 
education levels, income levels, average age of the population, poverty 
levels, ethnic diversity, urbanization 
3. International factors—including both incentives provided by the 
International community in the form of various types of aid and advantage 
an individual African country may have with the international community 
based on the presence of highly demand natural resources. 
4. Geographical factors—including the impact of neighbors, natural 
resources, the presence of ports, and terrain. 
The following sections will discuss each of these categories and factors within 
them that explain, at least in part, why some leaders achieve mandate extensions while 
others do not.  
2. Governmental Factors 
a. Personal Cost/Benefit Calculations by the Leader 
By far the most frequent theme in the literature regarding whether a leader will 
attempt to stay or will go is the unconstrained capacity for unilateral action enjoyed by 
                                                 
23 Kristin McKie, “Comparative Continuismo: Presidential Term Limit Adherence across Developing 
Democracies” (working paper, Kellogg Institute, Notre Dame, IN, 2016).  
7 
leaders. Baturo advocates that presidents themselves determine their own behavior with 
regard to succession and suggests that understanding the decision a president will make 
requires a proper understanding of the costs and benefits of staying in office for that 
particular leader.24 Posner and Young appear to agree, hypothesizing that leaders attempt 
to stay in power when benefits of doing so are high and costs are low. Considerations that 
may influence a president’s decision include an affinity for power, opportunities for 
personal enrichment, fear of prosecution or marginalization after leaving office, and 
pressure to maintain patronage networks and the ability to win elections. 
Vencovsky reminds us that the attraction of power remains a strong motivating 
factor for many African leaders and that some African elections are “heavily burdened by 
advantages incumbents have at their disposal.”25 Prominent among these advantages are 
patron-client networks through which the president, who also usually heads the political 
party, is able to distribute state resources throughout his population as he sees fit in order 
to appease those that might threaten his rule.26 Differing levels of clientelism across 
countries, therefore, may be one explanation for why some leaders are more or less likely 
to attempt extensions of their mandates and remain in power. Similarly, in countries 
where leaders may stand to significantly increase their personal wealth, attempts to 
extend mandates may be more likely than in countries that do not offer such 
opportunities. For some leaders, an affinity for power may drive a desire to remain in 
office in a country with few constraints to limit that power. 
Personal traits of the president may contribute to his decision regarding adherence 
to term limits. A frequent explanation for the success of leaders who are able to extend 
their mandates is the dominance of the leader’s party including control of the legislature 
and judiciary. McKie notes that when founders of a new political party are the first party 
figure to hold the presidency, the party is less able to “play a constraining role on 
                                                 
24 Baturo, Democracy.  
25 Vencovsky, “Presidential Term Limits.”  
26 Ibid.  
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ambitions to evade term limits.”27 Therefore, differences in the status of the president as a 
party founder and his consequent ability to exert control over legislators and judges may 
explain differences in his adherence or lack of adherence to term limits. 
Leaders’ motivations for contravention of term limits are not always completely 
self-serving. They may include fears and pressures from other parties. For example, as 
much as a leader might not want to leave power because of the loss of access to state 
resources, those in the leader’s network may also provide pressure for him to remain in 
power so that they continue to receive resources as part of their leader’s network.28 
Additionally, in some countries, the constraint of potential prosecution by a future 
administration may be an incentive for their leader to attempt to stay in office whereas in 
a country with little or no danger of future prosecution, the leader might be more likely to 
leave at the end of his mandate.29 In countries that have little or no experience with 
leaders out of power, fears of marginalization and possibly loss of wealth once out of 
office might prompt a leader to attempt mandate extension.30 
b. Governmental Constraints on Mandate Extensions 
Many questions arise as to why African leaders who have chosen to attempt 
mandate extensions attain divergent results. The degree to which a leader is successful in 
achieving constitutional change to extend his mandate depends on a number of factors in 
each of the four categories mentioned above, most of which fall into the government 
category. No matter how much a president might want to stay in office in order to gain 
wealth or avoid possible prosecution or marginalization, the legislature passes 
amendments and the judiciary that renders interpretive decisions regarding 
constitutionality. Thus, differences in causes of or constraints to constitutional change 
from one country to another appear to be fundamental to explaining why term limits are 
                                                 
27 McKie, “Comparative Continuismo.”  
28 Vencovsky, “Presidential Term Limits.”  
29 Ibid.  
30 Ibid.  
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upheld in some cases and overturned in others. Understanding the balance of power 
between the president and institutions of government is an essential piece of this puzzle.  
The degree to which the president controls his own party compared to the degree 
of horizontal accountability, as discussed by Opalo,31 would appear be an explanatory 
factor for differences in outcomes when presidents have sought to extend term limits. The 
constitutional provision for term limits is aimed at protecting horizontal accountability 
and the logic of that might dictate that legislators and judges would act to enforce term 
limits in order to maintain their power relative to that of the president. In fact, however, 
they have, in a significant number of instances, voted to extend or abolish term limits.32 
McKie takes what she describes as an “actor-centric” view of this behavior, finding that 
legislative and judicial “veto players”33 support the president’s wishes when they believe 
it is in their best interest to do so.34 That is to say, they believe whether or not he stays 
determines whether they stay. The extent to which horizontal accountability provides or 
fails to provide robust checks and balances may explain the different outcomes for 
leaders attempting to extend mandates.  
Similarly, the degree of cohesion of the leader’s party and the competitive 
strength of opposition political parties may affect horizontal accountability and thereby a 
leader’s ability to accomplish constitutional change with regard to term limits. 
Differences in these areas from one country to another may explain why some leaders 
succeed and others fail in their attempts to stay in office. As seen in Zambia and Malawi, 
when leaders do not have sufficient legislative support, they may be constrained to go.  
While no one of these within government factors may, in itself, explain one 
leader’s success in evading term limits and another leader’s failure, their combined 
impact and the interaction among them may offer useful insights into why some leaders 
                                                 
31 Ken Opalo, “Term Limits and Democratic Consolidation in sub-Saharan Africa: Lessons from 
Burundi,” July 30, 2015, ConstitutionNet, http://www.constitutionnet.org/news/term-limits-and-
democratic-consolidation-sub-saharan-africa-lessons-burundi.  
32 McKie, “Comparative Continuismo.”  
33 Ibid.  
34 Ibid.  
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are able to stay while others go. The impacts of societal factors, international factors and 
geographical factors may serve to shift the balance of power within the government by 
delivering their own pressures on both the president and the institutions of government. 
3. Societal Factors  
Societal factors, the second source of influence that may affect a leader’s 
adherence to term limits, have received less direct attention in the literature. However, it 
could be inferred that one reason leaders are able to extend their mandates is the relative 
weakness and lack of involvement of society in matters of their governance. Vencovsky 
identifies three societal factors that affect the leader’s ability to successfully extend or 
abolish term limits: the relative strength of civil society, the level of media independence, 
and the popularity of the president among the people.35 The social factors of public 
education level and the degree of disparity between rural and urban outlooks, which 
could also be argued is related to education, may also affect a leader’s success in 
extending his mandate.36 
a. Demographics Associated with Support for Term Limits 
Dulani found that in response to AfroBarometer surveys, approximately three 
fourths of Africans expressed support for term limits.37 Level of formal education appears 
to be an important demographic characteristic associated with this support. Yarwood 
notes that people with higher formal education levels tend to favor term limits at even 
higher rates than those with less formal education.38 The Organization for Economic 
Coordination and Development (OECD) explored the social benefits of formal education, 
finding that higher levels of formal education (in this case, secondary school) helped to 
promote other behaviors associated with good government such as active citizenship 
                                                 
35 Vencovsky, “Presidential Term Limits.”  
36 Stephen Lurie, “Highly Educated Countries Have Better Governments,” The Atlantic, June 3, 2016; 
Robin Harding, “Urban-Rural Differences in Support for Incumbents across Africa” (working paper no. 
120, Afro Barometer, 2010), http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Working%20 
paper/AfropaperNo120.pdf.  
37 Dulani, “Personal Rule.”  
38 Janette Yarwood, “The Power of Protest,” Journal of Democracy 27, no. 3 (2016): 51–60.  
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measured in terms of increased percentages of voting, volunteering and political 
interest.39 Additionally, higher levels of formal education contribute to containing 
violence, supporting a free press and increased use of social media.40 Not surprisingly, 
voters who are more educated and those with more exposure to news media express 
greater support for term limits. Stephen Lurie emphasizes the importance of formal 
education by pointing out that, even in governments that are not democratic, “More 
educated societies make more accountable government.”41 When governments are more 
accountable to their people and the people support term limits, we can reasonably expect 
that the chances of having de facto adherence to term limits increases. 
Urbanization is also associated with support for or opposition to mandate 
extension. Significant distinctions sometimes exist between the political views and 
preferences of urban and rural populations. Project for the Study of the 21st Century 
(PS21), a global think tank, reports that rural and urban populations have different 
priorities. Rural populations are more likely to support incumbents.42 In Burundi, for 
example, President Pierre Nkurunziza relied heavily on his base of rural support in his 
bid for a third term. In fact, he negatively characterized his opposition as being urban 
based.43 To these rural populations, relative stability can be associated with continuity in 
leadership. Where countries have larger rural populations, we may find that it is easier for 
incumbents to extend their mandates.44  
Cities, on the other hand, possess several attributes that render them more 
susceptible to opposition against mandate extensions. Yarwood notes that young urban 
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male residents tend to support term limits to a greater extent than older rural residents.45 
Urban populations tend to be younger. In 2015, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation reported that 
three quarters of the urban population in Africa is under 35 years of age.46 Since the 
demographic of youth is correlated to support for term limits, we can expect urban areas 
to support more frequent turnover of power. Additionally, PS21 found that cities 
symbolize a place of refuge for the elites or incumbent government forces.”47 Here, the 
exigencies of the ruling class are in plain view, which could contribute to support for 
more frequent turnovers of power. 
b. Civil Society Organizations 
When society is organized into civil society organizations (CSOs), these entities 
function as independent actors and are uniquely positioned to expose and rebuke 
governmental incompetence or corruption and to pressure for reform. Civil society 
organizations may be NGOs, faith based organizations, business forums, think tanks, 
labor unions, philanthropic foundations, or grassroots organizations.48 They build 
capacity by bringing resources and expertise to bear on problems faced by the societies in 
which they operate. Dulani explains the importance of civil society activism describing 
the need for a “critical mass of civil society that plays a central role in the governance 
arena including helping to hold governments accountable.”49 Numerous CSOs throughout 
Africa have recognized and have become increasingly vocal regarding the importance of 
term limits and are working hard to politically mobilize the majority of Africans who 
express support for term limits.50 
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Dulani explains the disconnect between public support for term limits and the 
number of leaders who have been successful in extending/abolishing them in this way: 
“ordinary African citizens (are rarely) allowed formal space to make their voices heard in 
these debates. Instead, term-limit advocates fight for space, often in the street and 
sometimes at great risk to their lives.”51 Recent research does include accounts of 
protests against attempts by leaders to extend term limits in countries such as Burundi, 
Republic of Congo and Burkina Faso. In many instances, those who dared to protest were 
arrested or otherwise intimidated or detained.52 As the expectations of Africans climb and 
lead to a growing push for government accountability, Baturo writes optimistically that 
those nations with “stronger civil societies will be able to mobilize against presidents 
who seek to extend their mandates.”53 In some countries, the primary way this happen is 
in mass protests. Differences in civil society—the degree to which civil society 
understands why term limits are important and is capable of staging powerful protests in 
support of them—may explain why leaders achieve third terms in some countries and fail 
to achieve them in other. 
4. International Factors
International influences can play a role in determining whether a leader 
experiences success or failure in extending term limits. Recently, the United States and 
Western donors have increased public pressure for African leaders to honor term limits.54 
In one such example, in July of 2015, U.S. President Barack Obama spoke to the African 
Union describing term limits as a core feature of democracy; saying, “Africa’s 
51 Boniface Dulani, “African Publics Strongly Support Term Limits, Resist Leaders Efforts to Extend 
Their Tenure,” AfroBarometer Dispatch, no 30, May 25, 2016, http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/ 
publications/Dispatches/ab_r6_dispatchno30.pdf.  
52 Van Woudenberg and Sawyer, “Africa’s Softer, Gentler Coups d’Etat.” 
53 Baturo, Democracy.  
54 Scott Stearns, “U.S.: African Leaders Should Honor Constitutional Term Limits,” Voice of America: 
Africa, July 9, 2014, http://www.voanews.com/a/us-says-african-leaders-should-honor-constitutional-term-
limits/1954274.html.  
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democratic progress is at risk when leaders refuse to step aside when their terms end.”55 
Additionally, the United States has imposed sanctions, a recent example being against 
officials from the DRC when, in 2016, President Joseph Kabila refused to schedule a 
presidential election when his mandate was ending.56 Pressure to abide by term limits has 
also come from within Africa itself as the AU has called for respect for term limits.57 In 
addition, African opinion leaders have championed the need for term limits. One such 
leader, Sudanese billionaire Mo Ibrahim, has established a $5 million prize for “a 
democratic head of state that has left office in the last three years and demonstrated 
excellent leadership.” In 2009, 2010, 2012, and 2013, the prize was not awarded because 
no leader stepped down.58  
In addition to public opinion pressure, international pressure stemming from the 
impact of donor aid has also been influential in some countries in which a leader sought a 
third term. Baturo contrasts the experiences of Malawi and Uganda. In Malawi, a county 
in which almost half of the national budget is dependent on support from donors, 
President Muluzi’s bid to extend his time in office was weakened by the International 
Monetary Fund’s (IMF) decision to withdraw aid. In Uganda, on the other hand, Baturo 
explains that donors did not exert much influence and President Museveni was successful 
in his 2005 bid for a third term.59 Posner and Young argue that African presidents do feel 
constrained by international pressure. In support of their argument, they point to the fact 
that the median level of foreign aid (as a percentage of GDP) in countries where 
presidents did not attempt to seek a third term was 12.1 percent compared to 7.3 percent 
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in countries where presidents did attempt to seek a third term—and largely succeeded.60 
Furthermore, Baturo found that successful tenure expansions were more likely among 
leaders with weak linkages to the West.61 If that correlation is reversed, it appears that 
association with the West is associated with respect for term limits.  
Yet despite instances in some countries when international public opinion 
pressure or the conditionality of aid appear to have influenced adherence to term limits, 
some point to concerns about the effectiveness and limitations of international influence. 
While Opalo believes there is a role for the international community to play in supporting 
respect for term limits, he has pointed to Burundi in 2014 as an example of when, 
because of geopolitical concerns, the international community did not speak out 
unequivocally against third terms.62 Matfess has also noted that economic relationships 
have not been “unduly strained” by mandate extensions, pointing to World Bank data 
regarding Foreign Direct Investment flows that show only a slight decline in the amount 
of FDI received between the years prior to the repeal of term limits and the year after the 
term limit was repealed. This indicates that there was no real financial consequence for 
leaders who extended their mandates.63 Adding to the mix of potential impacts of 
international influences is the increasing number of non-traditional players/donors in the 
African aid market. Countries like Brazil, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Russia, China and India 
are providing development assistance to African countries, with China by far being the 
largest.64 One would not logically expect conditions of aid from non-Western donors to 
foster respect for presidential term limits.  
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Gibson, Hoffman, and Jablonski write that, for the most part, research has not 
shown that aid has a robust impact on democratic consolidation, which presumably 
includes adherence to term limits. They argue that aid, in particular, may impede 
democratization when it is fungible and, therefore, “increases the ability of governments 
to engage in patronage spending.”65 However, when aid is provided under conditions of 
increased donor oversight, Gibson, Hoffman, and Jablonski find that it can positively 
affect democratization,66 including regard for term limits.  
Differing levels of need for donor aid and the impact of international opinion may 
explain why some leaders succeed in staying and others have to go. The degree to which 
one country is vulnerability to consequences of negative public opinion such as reduced 
tourism or trade and another is not, may explain the success or failure of a leader to stand 
for a third term. Among aid dependent countries, differences in available providers of aid, 
the conditionality of aid, and the fungibility of aid may explain why some leaders 
succeed and others fail in extending or abolishing term limits. 
5. Natural Resources/Government Revenue  
Geographical factors might also influence whether or not leaders are successful in 
extending their terms in office. As of 2015, six of eight leaders in oil-producing countries 
had attempted to extend their stays in power, while the percentage is much lower in non-
oil producing countries. There are several ways that resource wealth may contribute to 
leaders’ ability to extend their mandates. First, the “rentier effect,” described by Michael 
Ross and others, may increase both the pressure and the ability of ruling incumbents to 
monopolize state resources, rule through patronage networks and, as a result, possess 
both the pressure and ability to extend their mandates. Ross reports that wealth from 
natural resources, particularly oil, is associated with reduced democratic accountability 
and that even in democratic states it can, under certain conditions, promote the 
breakdown of democratic governments. He specifically mentions the vulnerability of low 
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and middle-income countries such as those in sub-Saharan Africa.67 We may also 
speculate that nascent, non-consolidated democracies would be more susceptible to these 
effects than older, more stable democracies, including the extension of mandates.  
Second, relative to aid-dependent countries, countries with resource wealth may 
be less susceptible to pressures from donors to adhere to democratic constitutional rule. 
International Monetary Fund economist Rabah Areziki argues that, like aid, income from 
resource wealth eases spending constraints on governments whereas, unlike aid, it comes 
with no donor strings attached.68 Additionally, resource wealth often represents 
substantially more money than the amount of aid received,69 providing resources for 
strengthening and extending patronage as well as a cushion for mismanagement, both of 
which are likely to increase a leader’s capacity to control his party and successfully 
accomplish extension of his mandate. 
Third, taxpayers in resource-rich countries may be less empowered to exert 
influence on their executive leaders. When government is not reliant upon citizens for 
revenue in the form of taxes, it is more likely to be unaccountable to them and, as well, 
citizens may feel less invested and thereby be less likely to participate in government or 
to monitor government spending.70 In resource-rich countries, governments receive their 
largest revenues from extractive industries rather than from citizens. Furthermore, 
resource revenues are often secret, further decreasing citizen awareness of or involvement 
in government spending.71 The Natural Resource Governance Institute reports an 
increased likelihood that governments in resource-rich countries will be autocratic. More  
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money for patronage coupled with reduced citizen involvement may explain why. It may 
also be an explanation for why differences in the presence or absence of natural resources 
may account for the success of some leaders and the failure or others in extending their 
mandates.  
This literature review indicates the interdependence and interaction of factors in 
the four categories discussed—governmental, societal, international and geographical. 
The research question is made more complex because a change in one may impact the 
other three. The two factors that appear to be most subject to influence from within a 
particular country and that have the best potential to be studied within that scope are 
governmental and societal. The literature review yielded far more information on 
government influences regarding mandate extension than on societal influences, although 
there are references to the idea that African civil societies are becoming more political 
and more engaged in the term limit debate. Since this research is conducted as a within 
country study and there is less research on societal factors, it is appropriate that the study 
focus on societal influences.  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Much of the existing literature focuses on the costs and benefits of extending 
mandates. That literature, however, tends to ignore the ways that costs can change due to 
demographic and societal changes. One potential hypothesis that emerges from the 
literature review is that leaders have been successful in extending their mandates when 
their power is greater than that of society. In the literature, much attention is paid to the 
factors that strengthen the leader’s position—legacy, patronage networks, military, 
control of the ruling party, means necessary to bribe or coerce. Less attention is paid to 
factors that strengthen society. One might speculate that among such factors are literacy 
rates, median income, urbanization, functioning civil society organizations, access to 
news media, and free press. This thesis will investigate the hypothesis that societal 
factors are critical for understanding when leaders will be constrained by societal groups 
in extending their stays in office.  
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My investigation will focus on three broad topics: education, urbanization and 
civil society, and will explore their synergistic impact on the power of society to 
constrain government leaders. Civic education matters because, as we have seen, it 
increases the level of civic engagement among citizens and enhances the ability of 
citizens to participate in public institutions and contribute to civil society organizations. 
Urbanization matters because it concentrates social power in cities. As discussed 
previously, governmental power has largely been there already. Urbanization also 
changes the social fabric of the city. New, mostly younger migrants come expecting to 
improve their living conditions. Stark inequalities are more visible in urban than in rural 
areas, particularly when those inequalities affect thousands of people. The strength-in-
numbers potential of social unrest and violence may, in itself, serve as a constraint on 
governmental leaders. Urbanization makes possible the power that emerges from 
connection. When the connections are among more educated citizens, then urbanization 
can drive governments to be more accountable. 
Civil society matters because civil society organizations have the ability to focus 
attention and resources on needed problem solving or reform such as sanitation in the 
slums or African leaders who attempt to abolish/expand term limits. Arguably, the 
strength or weakness of civil society organizations depends on their legitimacy among the 
people they wish to serve. Better-educated citizens are more likely to understand the 
purposes and strategies of the civil society organization and be able to support and 
contribute to it. When those citizens are in urban areas, the power of connection—
ideological and proximal—is brought to bear. 
While the investigation focuses on the factors of urbanization, education, and the 
functioning of Civil Society Organizations, other factors that may emerge and appear to 
have predictive value will be noted and shared with the reader in Chapter IV. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis will conduct a within-case comparison of two specific events in 
Burkina Faso, comparing the period of constitutional change leading up to and including 
the 2005 and 2010 elections, in which President Blaise Compaore successfully ran for a 
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third and fourth term, to the 2011–2014 period ending in a coup in which Compaore was 
forced out of power for attempting to abolish constitutionally mandated term limits. The 
thesis will compare the social and political contexts surrounding each event and use 
comparative case analysis to determine what changes may have occurred over time to 
prevent Compaore from succeeding where he had before in extending his stay in office.  
Burkina Faso is unique in offering the opportunity for comparing success and 
failure of the African third-term phenomenon in a single state because there have been 
multiple episodes surrounding changes made to Article 37 of the constitution, the Article 
regarding term limits—removal, reinstatement, resetting the clock, and an attempted 
removal for a second time. This methodological approach is appropriate for this thesis 
because the objective is to contribute to the body of research regarding how societal 
elements can evolve and strengthen to the point of being able to check the power of an 
executive.  
This research will be based on the hypothesis that, in 2014, there were additional 
effective constraints on President Compaore and that these constraints likely came from 
public sentiment and civil society within Burkina Faso. In order to conduct this analysis, I 
will rely on previous accounts and research conducted on the individual events in order to 
compare and decipher what social changes occurred in the approximate decade between 
the events that allowed the public to organize and prohibit Compaore from extending his 
stay in office as he had before.  
Data will be collected from scholarly sources as well as from respected 
contemporaneous sources when available. Most importantly, primary data from in-
country interviews conducted by the author and project advisor with Burkina Faso 
government officials and civil society representatives will be relied on heavily for context 
and understanding of the societal changes in Burkina Faso. 
This thesis consists of four parts. Following this introductory chapter, Chapter II 
will discuss social opposition to President Compaore as it existed between 1997 and 
2005, the time of his successful mandate extension. Chapter III will trace and explain 
changes in society between 2005 and the successful overthrow of Compaore in 2014, 
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preventing his second attempt at mandate extension. The concluding chapter, Chapter IV 
will analyze driving forces of the changes in society and explore what predictive value 
they have for assessing the likelihood that leaders in other African countries may be able 
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE  
A. INTRODUCTION 
In 2005, the president of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaore, ran successfully for a 
third term in office despite a constitutional provision that limited presidents to two terms. 
Compaore justified this third term bid based on a technicality. He first ran for office in 
1991 following the adoption of a new constitution that contained a presidential term limit 
provision of two terms of seven years each.72 In 1997, prior to Compaore’s run for re-
election and at his instigation, Compaore’s Congress for Democracy and Progress Party 
(CDP) passed an amendment removing term limits from the Constitution.73 In 1998, 
Compaore was re-elected, this time under a constitution with no provision for term 
limits.74 By 2000, lingering protests compelled Compaore to reinstate term limits: in this 
case, two terms of five years each.75 However, when Compaore sought a third term in 
2005, he and his supporters argued that the 2000 constitutional amendment imposing 
term limits could not be applied retroactively to him, and, under the constitution in place 
in 2005, he was therefore entitled to run for two five-year terms.76 In 2010, he ran 
successfully for a fourth term based on the same technicality.77  
This chapter will discuss how and why society was not at this time empowered to 
stop Compaore from resetting the clock and running for a third term. It will explore the 
social and political context in which the 2005 election occurred because it was in 2005 
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that Compaore first evaded term limits and ran for a third term. Once he had been 
successful in resetting the clock for 2005, his running in the 2010 election was almost 
certain as he would not need to extend his mandate again until 2015. Focusing specific 
attention on the relevance of the three focuses of this study—urbanization, education, and 
the function of civil society organizations—this chapter will examine the nature of these 
societal factors as they existed during the period of constitutional change beginning with 
the 1997 removal of term limits from the Constitution and continuing to the time of 
Compaore’s third term victory in 2005. This chapter will analyze how, during these 
years, the balance of power between society and Compaore fluctuated as he abolished 
and then reinstated term limits into the Constitution. It will describe the sources of social 
opposition to Compaore at this time and explain why, due to their state of development, 
ideology, and intention, they were not empowered to constrain Compaore’s extension of 
his mandate in 2005. Furthermore, the chapter will recount an instance of societal 
opposition to Compaore, which is important for two reasons: first, it had significant 
impact on societal opposition to Compaore throughout the remainder of his tenure, and, 
second, it resulted in Compaore’s reinstating term limits into the 2000 constitution. 
Although his overthrow occurred fourteen years later, the reinstatement of term limits in 
2000 was pivotal to Compaore’s eventual ousting.  
B. URBANIZATION, EDUCATION, AND CIVIL SOCIETY 
ORGANIZATIONS  
An explanation of Compaore’s urban opposition will be helpful to our 
understanding of the influence of urbanization, education and civil society. In a 2017 
interview, Dr. Abdoul Karim Saidou with the Centre pour la Gouvernance Democratique 
(CGD) explained that opposition to Compaore was almost entirely urban.78 For context, 
Burkina Faso’s urban population more than doubled between 1998 and 2010, increasing 
from 1,810,997 to 4,011,970, and increasing as a percentage of total population from 
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16.5 percent to 25.7 percent.79 During this period, however, increases in urban population 
did not mean much in terms of preventing Compaore from extending his mandate.  
Five sources of opposition to Compaore existed: opposition political parties, trade 
unions, human rights organizations, civil society organizations, and Thomas Sankara 
loyalists. Although there were many opposing political parties during this period, 
Compaore was never threatened electorally by the political opposition. There are 
predictable reasons for this. Compaore dominated the rural vote because he had the 
support of the rural Mossi chiefs, and the rural population remained more than 50 percent 
of Burkina Faso’s total population throughout Compaore’s rule.80 Compaore had an 
extensive and effective patronage network that garnered and maintained support for 
him.81 If ever he needed more votes, he had the resources to buy them.82 While this 
chapter may mention political opponents in the context of other discussions, our focus 
will be on four sources of social opposition, by far the most influential of which were 
trade unions/students.  
In the early years of Compaore’s rule, the power of civil society rested primarily 
with trade unions, which played a central opposition role in Burkina Faso, protesting 
against limitations on workers’ rights since the time of its independence in 1960.83 
Rupley, Bangali, and Diamitani explain that in much of Africa, the trade union movement 
has little independence or influence.84 In Burkina Faso, however, the 1991 constitution, 
which the unions had influenced, gave workers the right to organize, to engage in 
collective bargaining, and to strike for improved working conditions and higher wages.85 
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Six large Burkinabe trade associations together with sixteen individual, independent trade 
unions make up the influential umbrella organization, Unite d’Action Syndicale (UAS).86 
Engels offers further insight into the functioning of the Burkinabe trade unions, 
explaining that they are “organized along ideological lines …and are active in fields 
beyond those that are directly work related.”87 Sub-Saharan Africa has been slow to 
develop industrially and perhaps as a consequence of that, large-scale industrial trade 
unions are not as prevalent as in Western countries.88 In Burkina Faso, the largest group 
of trade union members is composed of civil servants, with the unions representing the 
fields of education and health wielding the most influence. Burkina Faso’s unions also 
represent both secondary students and university students.89 Engels offers insight 
regarding the role of trade unions as civil society activists, writing that “the fact that 
members of these trade unions are predominantly among the urban, well-educated middle 
class and that student organizations consider themselves to be trade unions, explains why 
alliances and joint protests by trade unions and students are relatively easy to organize 
and occur frequently.”90 Additionally, Engels believes these commonalities explain the 
urban nature of most political protests, where Burkina Faso’s official language of French 
is spoken and where, in Burkina Faso between 1998 and 2005, urban trade union 
members comprised the power of civil society.91  
Human rights organizations, civil society organizations, and Thomas Sankara 
loyalists are also among the social opposition. Such human rights organizations as 
Amnesty International and Movement Burkina des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples 
(MBDHP), the largest human rights organization in Burkina Faso, were active throughout 
Compaore’s rule.92 Although at times, as we will explore, these human rights 
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organizations joined the trade unions in mass protests, they were insufficient to prevent 
Compaore’s obtaining a third term for several reasons. First, the social opposition base 
was limited to only a specific section of urban society. Second, their intention was to 
obtain improvements in benefits for workers and to seek justice and an end to impunity. 
Finally, because their ideology was socialist leaning, not democratic, and therefore their 
focus was not on protecting term limits.  
While trade unions made up the bulk of social society opposition and trade unions 
and human rights organizations at times joined together in opposition, other segments of 
civil society were not as influential in opposing Compaore between 1997 and 2005. Civil 
society organizations existed for a number of purposes such as benefitting women, youth, 
and farmers.93 However, in the early years, according to Saidou, these civil society 
organizations lacked development. Often created for a charitable purpose, many such 
organizations had limited resources and their leadership was neither experienced with nor 
focused on political activism at that time.94 After 2005, powerful civil society 
organizations such as the Centre for the Democratic Governance of Burkina Faso (CDG) 
were formed.95 The CDG and the social changes that occurred after 2005 will be 
discussed in Chapter III. 
Sankara Loyalist opposition members were primarily loyal to Compaore’s 
predecessor, Thomas Sankara, a Marxist revolutionary who was assassinated in the 1987 
coup that brought Compaore to power. A number of university professors were among 
the Sankara loyalists, and they feared violence and repression because they were familiar 
with assassinations and disappearances of university professors in the coup that took out 
Sankara.96 Explored in Chapter III, the killing of Sankara remained a hot button issue 
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among many Burkinabe and Sankara’s name would be an important symbol in the 
uprising that ousted Compaore.97  
Although the trade unions, the MBDHP, and Sankara loyalists would challenge 
Compaore regularly via demonstrations, and would succeed in gaining various 
concessions, they were ultimately not interested in competing with Compaore at the 
ballot box. Compaore’s most powerful opposition, the trade unions, were particularly 
focused on improving wages and working conditions for members.98 Bantenga explains 
that Compaore kept the unions at bay through the appeasement of concessionary wage 
increases.99 This met the trade unions’ goal and let the public see that he responded to 
pressure, thereby making it important for societal groups to maintain pressure against 
Compaore. That unions could easily be appeased by the government and declined to 
participate fully in electoral politics weakened their interest and ability to mount a 
challenge to Compaore in the face of his efforts to run for a third term. 
Internal divisions also weakened the trade unions. A May 2004 report issued by 
the Swedish International Development Corporation Agency (SIDA) found that the role 
played by Burkina Faso’s trade unions in the process of democratization had been 
ambivalent.100 As described by SIDA, this ambivalence is a result of a divide in the 
movement between a moderate wing and a “radical and revolutionary wing” with 
socialist roots.101 During Compaore’s rule, the revolutionary wing dominated, which is 
why the trade unions have opposed dictatorships and have often instigated public 
uprisings against government limitations on public freedoms.102 Likewise, the leader of  
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the Human Rights movement, in Burkina Faso, the MBDHP, was, according to Saidou, a 
socialist leaning organization whose mission focuses on justice but not necessarily 
political reform.103 These groups wanted justice in the face of violence and impunity, 
protection of wages and good working conditions, and social equities such as fair prices 
for food, but did not work to promote democracy.  
Interestingly, although there were many protests against Compaore’s seeking a 
third term leading up to the 2005 election, Saidou indicates that the constitutional term 
limit issue did not come to the forefront until 2013.104 The 2005 protests were more 
against Compaore for reasons such as corruption, violence, impunity or rising prices, 
rather than protests in the interest of protecting the constitution and the term limit 
provisions it contained. Instead, trade unions, human rights organizations and Sankara 
loyalists shared socialist political motivations and associated themselves with a 
“clandestine” party that eventually hoped to promote a social revolution. This contributed 
to an apparent lack of interest on the part of Burkina Faso’s strongest social groups to 
stop Compaore from manipulating the constitution and running for a third term. 
C. INTERACTION BETWEEN SOCIETY AND COMPAORE  
The primary tool of the opposition was big, noisy, and sometimes violent protests, 
most often held in the country’s largest city, the capital city of Ouagadougou, and 
sometimes the second-largest city of Bobo-Dioulasso. From the outset of his rule, the 
Burkinabe people found reasons to take to the streets in protest against the Compaore 
government. A variety of grievances sparked these protests. The early 1990s were a time 
of significant change in Burkina Faso and across the region.105 Immediately after 
Compaore was elected to his first term in 1991, the initial phase of structural adjustment 
(1991–1993) was implemented and the trade unions that had been happy with the more 
liberal provisions of the 1991 constitution now protested the country’s new economic 
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policy orientation toward the global market as a result of loans from the IMF and 
World Bank.106  
Protests often ignited as a reaction to violence perpetrated by the Compaore 
government and the perceived impunity of those committing it. The 1991 Constitution 
contained democratic provisions such as granting free speech, freedom of the press, and 
freedom of assembly. However, after Compaore was in office, many felt there was a 
regression toward an authoritarian regime.107 Given the weakness of social groups as 
outlined in the previous section, Compaore was generally successful in employing five 
strategies, which were often overlapping, to ensure his hold on power could continue past 
his first two elected terms in office.  
To Compaore, staying in power meant being on the ballot, winning elections, and 
not being overthrown. The first, and the strategy most clearly related to the topic of this 
thesis, is constitutional manipulation, a strategy that kept him on the ballot in 2005 and 
2010 and gave him a technically plausible argument justifying his bids for third and 
fourth terms, respectively, in those years. Society was vulnerable to this tool in large 
part because, as described previously, Compaore’s primary trade union opposition was 
more interested in concessions that protected wages and working conditions than in 
regime change.  
Society was also vulnerable to Compaore’s second strategy, using state resources 
to bolster his control. This strategy solidified Compaore’s power in two ways. First, it 
helped him win elections by having the funds from state coffers at his disposal.108 
University of Ouagadougou history professor Willy Bantenga indicates clearly that 
Compaore was simply able to buy the votes needed to win.109 It also enabled Compaore’s 
extensive system of patronage. In 2010, the Center for Applied Policy Research at 
Munich University found Compaore’s strategy of patronage, to be one of the main 
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reasons for the failure of the electoral process to bring about change in Burkina Faso.110 
In addition to helping Compaore win elections because beneficiaries supported his 
staying in office, patronage enabled Compaore to obtain loyalty from beneficiaries in 
times of social upheaval and in many cases to rule by “co-option rather than force.111 This 
strategy made regime change more difficult, especially for a societal opposition to which 
the rewards of regime change were not apparent.  
The third strategy, violence and repression, enabled Compaore to use the sharp 
edge of his administration, his much-hated private security force, The Regiment de 
Securite Presidentielle (RSP), to control opponents who were not amenable to 
patronage.112 While it was use of the RSP that often brought protesters into the street 
seeking justice, society was nonetheless unable to oust Compaore. The very real threat of 
violence is likely one reason society was not empowered to constrain Compaore at these 
times. Additionally, as previously described, the protesters sought justice and because of 
that focus, protesters were willing to settle for concessions rather than the ousting of 
Compaore. 
Society at this time was also ineffectual in resisting the fourth strategy, that of 
walking a strategic line between democracy and authoritarianism, thereby enabling 
Compaore to project the appearance of democracy in areas that did not threaten him, 
while using techniques of soft dictatorship and hard tactics of violence and brutality in 
areas that did.113 For example, the trade unions were interested in the right of assembly 
and the right to strike. Having these rights presented them the appearance of having a 
strong voice, but in reality, as we have seen throughout this discussion, most often the 
result of the trade unions’ protests was that they settled for concessions.  
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On rare occasions, however, Compaore’s fifth and, arguably, most important 
strategy of calculated appeasements enabled him to continue to placate particular groups 
such as the trade unions and to calm volatile situations that posed a threat to him. On 
these occasions, society’s bargaining power was stronger, but still not sufficient to 
prevent his becoming a third term president. 
D. AN EARLY EXAMPLE OF SOCIETY’S ABILITY TO CONSTRAIN 
COMPAORE 
Although this chapter focuses primarily on the reasons that society did not exert 
meaningful constraints on Compaore during his attempts to run for third and fourth terms, 
an uprising in 1998 provides some clues as to how changes in urbanization and civil 
society eventually served to increase the pressure on Compaore. The first mass protests of 
Compaore’s rule occurred in December of 1998. They resulted in a lasting power shift 
between Compaore and society and continued to energize the opposition until 
Compaore’s overthrow in 2014. The protests were triggered by the murder of well-known 
journalist Norbert Zongo, publisher and editor of the leading opposition newspaper 
L’independant.114 Three other men were also killed: Zongo’s brother, another journalist, 
and a driver. The bodies were discovered in a burned car, and the victims had been shot. 
At the time of his death, Norbert Zongo was researching a story about the torture and 
murder of Francois Ouedraogo, the driver for Compaore’s younger brother, also named 
Francois. Zongo had received death threats and had warned his readers that he might be 
killed.115 The government’s claim that Zongo’s death was an accident sparked protests in 
which tens of thousands of Burkinabe took to the streets in Ouagadougou in what were 
described as “unprecedented” demonstrations demanding an investigation and calling for 
an end to impunity.116 The protests showed the potential power of Burkina Faso’s urban 
population. 
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Although Burkina Faso had a well-documented history of protest before 1998, the 
protests following Zongo’s death were marked by an increasing intensity, duration, and 
effectiveness not previously seen. There were violent clashes with the army, the police 
and the RSP. Trade unions, students, and human rights organizations joined forces to 
form the “Collective of the Democratic Mass Organizations and Political Parties in order 
to co-ordinate civil society protests against impunity. The Collective still exists today.”117  
In response to these protests, Compaore used his strategy of calculated 
appeasement in order to prevent further escalation of the public uprisings, project an 
accommodating image—as Bantenga explained, international eyes were watching and aid 
dollars were on the line—and stay in power. In 2000, after months of bitter and 
protracted protests, Compaore reinstated presidential term limits, which appeared to be a 
significant a concession in the direction of democracy. Other reforms at this time 
included the introduction of a single ballot voting system, the formation of an 
independent electoral commission, institution of a system of public campaign financing, 
and establishing a third vice presidential position for the opposition leader.118 
Additionally, he created a council to review political crimes and make recommendations 
to “restore social peace.”119 
Why did these particular appeasements work in 2000? Bantenga points to two 
reasons. First, he focuses our attention on the nature of the opposition, explaining that, 
although the protests were very powerful, they did not achieve the level of organization 
needed for political change because the goal of the trade unions and human rights 
organizations that led them was justice in the face of violence and impunity, not regime 
change.120 As described earlier, the leaders of societal opposition at this time were not 
pro-democratic. The second reason offered by Bantenga reveals an important 
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characteristic of Burkinabe society at this time: its traditional structure. He explains that 
one influence on the trade unions in accepting Compaore’s appeasements was that the 
traditional leader, the Mossi King, intervened on Compaore’s behalf.121 However, 
Bantenga explains, while the changes made no real difference in the control exerted by 
Compaore,122 they were sufficiently convincing to an opposition not focused on 
democracy but rather on demanding an end to impunity and changes to the government’s 
authoritarian structure.  
Though the protests diminished, the lack of justice surrounding Norbert Zongo’s 
murder continued to energize the Burkinabe people.123 One year after Norbert Zongo’s 
death, Amnesty International reported that an Independent Commission of Inquiry had 
concluded that Zongo had been murdered for political motives and named six serious 
suspects, all members of Compaore’s Presidential Security Force (RSP).124 In 2006, the 
Burkina Faso judiciary dismissed the case, thereby confirming in the minds of many 
Burkinabe, the impunity of Compaore’s RSP. That decision was met with yet another 
round of angry protests.125 In 2014, the African Court on Human and People’s Rights 
found that the Burkina Faso court had not diligently investigated the murder of Norbert 
Zongo, that the government showed no will to hold the killer accountable, and that the 
killing was a method of intimidation that should not be allowed.126 
The significance of the killing of Norbert Zongo is hard to overstate. Rinaldo 
Depagne, director of International Crisis Group’s West Africa Programs, has described 
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the killing as the turning point in the Compaore regime.127 Depagne believes the lasting 
significance of the protests of Zongo’s death is that they “created confidence among 
citizens about their own rights.”128 Trade unions and other civil society organizations 
learned that Compaore responded to pressure,129 and from this point, the pressure on 
Compaore’s regime steadily increased.130  
E. CONCLUSION 
For Burkina Faso, the period between 1997 and 2005 was one of constitutional 
and social change but also a period in which Compaore, lacking meaningful opposition in 
society, continued to maintain his grip on power. Various groups found ways to interact 
with the leader, primarily via mass protests expressing grievances over wages, working 
conditions, violence, and impunity; but, ultimately, there was little appetite and 
questionable capacity to mount any serious challenges to Compaore’s pursuit of a third 
term. As such, in 2005, Compaore faced little threat that he would be defeated at the 
ballot box. He had a dominant political party, the rural vote, the ability to buy other votes 
if needed, and a system of patronage that engendered loyalty. Equally important, 
Compaore’s opposition during this time had goals other than political change. The trade 
unions responded to wage increases. Human rights organizations—and others at times of 
blatant abuse such as the killing of Norbert Zongo—sought justice. The tool of the 
opposition, mass protests, provided society some leverage. While at times these protests 
effectively constrained some aspects of Compaore’s behavior, there was little threat to 
Compaore’s ability to extend his mandate.  
As Chapter III will show, there existed a fundamentally different ideological 
movement in 2014 which was empowered to overthrow Compaore. There were two 
noticeable differences in society between the 1997–2005 episode and the events of 2014. 
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First, the urban population was considerably smaller and detached from the main 
opposition movements of the time. Second, the most active groups in 1997–2005 were 
trade unions and human rights groups with socialist leanings. They were content with 
advances in issues such as wages, working conditions, and justice. Other components of 
civil society at this time were not well-organized and not political. In essence, the 
intrinsic motivation and goal of civil society opposition at this time was not regime 
change. 
After 2005, increased urban growth coupled with demographic changes in urban 
society would empower civil society with regard to Compaore and, most importantly, a 
new component of civil society would emerge with a different—pro-democracy—
ideology, mobilizing a new group of urban citizens and would grow to become the 
dominant power of civil society. 
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III. DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIETAL CHANGES
A. INTRODUCTION 
When President Compaore announced that he would run in the election of 2010, 
facets of civil society speculated that he would attempt to abolish term-limits in order to 
run again in 2015. The fear that Compaore would once again try to manipulate the 
constitution to remove term limits created an undercurrent of tension within concerned 
elements of society, driving the events of the next few years toward the explosive popular 
uprising on October 31, 2014, in which he would be ousted. By that time, Compaore had 
lost one of his most important advantages, no longer having a plausible constitutional 
argument for his right to stand for re-election; and, in spite of his legislative and popular 
efforts, he never recovered that legitimacy. 
This chapter will discuss demographic and societal changes between 2005 and 
2014 that empowered society to stop Compaore from yet another extension of his 
mandate. The factors of urbanization and the functioning of civil society organizations 
were essential to society’s ability to oust Compaore. Following the 2005 election, 
changes in aspects particularly of urbanization and civil society resulted in an expanding 
and refocusing of societal opposition to Compaore to such a degree that Compaore’s 
strategies as described in the previous chapter no longer worked. The factor of formal 
education became less important as pro-democracy civil society groups were attracting 
new, urban, less well-educated youth.  
B. URBANIZATION, EDUCATION, AND CIVIL SOCIETY 
ORGANIZATIONS 
In the four years from 2005 to 2014, the urban population of Burkina Faso almost 
doubled, an increase that significantly influenced the makeup and functioning of the civil 
society opposition to Compaore.131 A majority of the urban growth was young. 
Approximately 65% of the population of Burkina Faso is under age twenty-five, and 
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many of these young Burkinabe were part of the internal rural-to-urban youth migration 
occurring in Burkina Faso.132 Large shanty-towns developed on the periphery of 
Ouagadougou, filled with unemployed young people looking for a better life. In contrast 
to traditional opposition members, these youth had less formal education and were not 
part of civil society organizations.133 The rapid expansion of the pro-democracy sector of 
civil society between 2005 and 2014 is in large part due to the mobilization of this 
growing urban youth population.  
Pro-democracy leader Saidou with the Center for the Democratic Governance of 
Burkina Faso (CDG) explained the pro-democracy movement in Burkina Faso and its 
appeal to young people. The pro-democracy movement was unique from its predecessors 
in several ways: it was more broadly appealing, it was focused on the ideology of 
constitutionalism and was not interested in concessions, and it was willing to demand that 
government function according to the constitution.134 As explained by Dr. Saidou, the 
appeal of the pro-democracy movement to young people was that it was not perceived to 
be intellectually demanding or exclusive in the way that communism was, and neither did 
the democracy movement desire to remain clandestine. As a result, pro-democracy 
messages appealed to young people outside the traditional university and intellectual 
circles in a way that communism did not.135  
C. PRO-DEMOCRACY BEGINNINGS 
Newly formed pro-democracy organizations such as the CDG, a coalition of 
human rights groups, lawyers, and judges founded in 2008, used a number of truly 
grassroots techniques to connect with this young migrant population.136 Many of the 
outreach tools were simple and low tech: flyers or posters with pictures of Barack Obama 
or Kofi Annan, radio in local languages, word of mouth, group meetings and events. 
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While there were certainly economic and logistical reasons for this—relatively low 
Internet penetration, for example—there may have been an important advantage as well. 
Author Thomas Friedman explained why such “analog”137 techniques might have been 
particularly effective, especially between 2005 and 2013 as the movement grew and 
before the decisive events of 2014. Friedman writes that gaining legitimacy involves 
making connections, building understanding and consensus, and gaining trust.138 Time 
spent early on by civil society pro-democracy groups such as CDG providing civic 
education and raising awareness of democracy and political activism among these young 
disenfranchised citizens developed those vital attributes. In Burkina Faso, the work of 
CDG and other pro-democracy civil society organizations demonstrated that having less 
formal education did not prevent these young people from understanding concepts that 
had a fundamental impact on their lives. Mobilization of this youthful, less well-educated 
group tipped the balance for the opposition in the overthrow of Compaore. 
CDG’s outreach also attracted more traditional elements of society such as 
university students. The CDG was formed by a group of lawyers, judges, and human 
rights organizations to “promote democratic governance through applied research, 
training, education, and facilitation of democratic dialog.”139 Dr. Saidou explains that 
CDG reached out to student groups and unions at the University of Ouagadougou, 
making inroads and raising awareness with students and professors. Many students and 
professors associated themselves with socialist ideology because they were drawn to its 
intellectual appeal, and they were primarily those who organized discussions and debated 
social and political topics. Following, and likely, at least in part, as a result of 
Compaore’s success in 2005, pro-democracy discussion gradually expanded on campus. 
CGD, in particular, engaged with university students and faculty using analog techniques 
such as sponsoring face-to-face discussion and debate competitions to contrast 
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democracy and socialism and to communicate the importance of consistency in 
democratic institutions. Over the next few years, discussions and debates regarding 
democracy and constitutionalism became a mainstay on the university campus.140 
Additional benefits of these analog techniques between 2008 and 2013 included 
providing a space for existing civil society writ large to absorb and respond to the pro-
democracy movement, for civil society organizations to develop themselves politically, 
and, significantly, for new pro-democratic civil society organizations to form.141 These 
years saw the creation of influential pro-democratic civil society groups, including in 
2011, the formidable Balai Citoyen that Yarwood described as pivotal in the defeat of 
Compaore.142  
D. PRO-DEMOCRACY MOMENTUM  
Founders of Balai Citoyen (Citizen’s Broom), students and journalists, were 
concerned about how Compaore had come to power, about recent violence involving the 
killing of student Justin Zongo, about Compaore’s enrichment of himself and elites at the 
expense of the Burkinabe people and also about how long he had been in office. Impunity 
and inequality were key words in the rallying cries of the organization.143 In a recent 
interview, Balai Citoyen’s public affairs officer explained that weak political opposition 
had failed to engage the 500 to 900 thousand jobless youths, especially non-university 
youths, in the Ouagadougou area.144 Balai Citoyen was non-partisan, pro-democratic and 
non-violent. Its aim was popular mobilization to “sweep out” poor government and 
protect the constitution.145 Balai Citoyen was a force multiplier in that it brought together  
existing, smaller groups. The message of Balai Citoyen was constitutional, but also  
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highlighted the economic and security consequences of a leader who had stayed in power 
too long. Balai Citoyen believed that the only way these needs would be addressed was 
through a change of power.  
Like CDG, Balai Citoyen focused on outreach and worked in bus stops and 
markets to reach everyday citizens, especially young, everyday citizens.146 Balai Citoyen 
also went out into smaller towns and rural areas, but its beginnings and most of its work 
were urban.147 In an interview, the organization’s Public Affairs Officer provided a 
contrast between the 1998 protests of the killing of Norbert Zongo at which time the 
traditional Mossi King had intervened on behalf of Compaore and another pivotal event 
in Burkina Faso, the 2011 protests of the killing of student Justin Zongo, saying that by 
2011 youths were protesting against traditional structures.148  
The groundwork accomplished by CDG and Balai Citoyen between 2008 and 
2013 was essential to the pro-democracy movements’ readiness for the rapid onset of 
events that would occur in 2014. When civil society broadened its participation base and 
used appeals to urban citizens lacking formal education, the pro-democracy movement 
was able to grow by reaching those who had been on the margins until now. The idea of 
democracy took root, slowly at first with an incubation period of sorts during which 
relationships could be solidified and ideas could be developed, discussed, and debated. 
The formation of Balai Citoyen increased momentum, but the movement would not reach 
full force until the events of 2013 provided clear direction for the cause. This time had 
arrived for the new societal opposition to coalesce and so commit to substantially new 
democratic ideas that pro-democracy groups replaced the trade unions as drivers of the 
opposition, and the goal was no longer concessions but rather protection of the 
constitution. 
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E. URBANIZATION AND PRO-DEMOCRACY CRITICAL MASS 
Just as it was new, young, urban migrants who provided the nucleus for the pro-
democracy movement, urbanization was also vital to that movement’s surge and success. 
Two particularly urban advantages are greater availability of the Internet and the presence 
of venues. Although cell phones and social media were not so impactful during the 
earliest years while some degree of consensus around democratic ideas was being 
established, they eventually played an important role in energizing and mobilizing civil 
society opponents to Compaore.  
Their impact began to be felt when, in 2011, largely via sharing on social media, 
the Burkina Faso pro-democracy movement was encouraged by the success of its 
neighbor, Senegal, when in conditions similar to those in Burkina Faso, a group known as 
Y’en a Marre emerged, formed by journalists and popular Senegalese rap musicians. 
“Y’en a Marre” means “We’re Fed Up”149 and, as Yarwood explains, they were “fed up 
with poverty, corruption, and growing inequality.”150 With music and media campaigns, 
Y’en a Marre reached out to Senegalese citizens, explaining why the constitution should 
be protected and developing campaigns such as, “Ne touch pas a ma constitution,” (Don’t 
touch my constitution), and “My vote is my weapon.” Senegalese leader Abdoulaye 
Wade, seeking a third term after a constitutional change allowing him to run, was voted 
out.151 From 2011 onward, social media was firmly in the corner of the pro-democracy 
opposition. 
Although lack of Internet access even in urban areas is still a concern in Burkina 
Faso, by 2011, the number of cell phones in use had increased from one million in 2005 
to ten million.152 LeBas has written that cell phones were a “deeply transformative”153 
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technology in the 2014 protests. On Twitter, #lwili, a reference to traditional clothing 
often worn by protesters, trended during the uprisings. Compaore, ironically, appealed for 
calm using his own Twitter account.154  
Another particularly urban advantage is that cities attract diverse groups of people 
and offer venues where ideas can be exchanged. Ouagadougou is an international city and 
one such venue was the Pan African Film Festival, International Cine Droit Libre Film 
Festival (FESPACO), which draws a large, international crowd. The rapper co-founders 
of Senegal’s Y’en a Marre attended the festival in 2013 where they met Burkinabe 
musicians and activists Smockey, a rapper, and Sams’K Le Jay, a reggae artist. In an 
example of what Lewis and Ross call “youth movements linked up across francophone 
Africa,”155 Y’en a Marre formed an alliance with Smockey and Sams’K Le Jah, helping 
them to propel Le Balai Citoyen and the pro-democracy movement into a game-changing 
vehicle.156 Yarwood writes that Balai Citoyen was likely the critical component leading 
to success in ousting Compaore.157 With the involvement of Smockey and Sams’K Le 
Jay, the pro-democracy movement burgeoned as throngs of young urban Burkinabe 
identified with and became part of the pro-democratic opposition.  
F. THE ISSUE OF TERM LIMITS 
The constitutional term-limit issue came to the forefront in 2013158 when 
Compaore openly began to make his first moves toward amending Article 37 of the 
constitution to extend term limits. By this time, Balai Citoyen and the pro-democracy 
civil society movement were ready for mass mobilization using social media, big events 
such as concerts and, of course, massive protests to constrain Compaore from achieving a 
second mandate extension.  
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As the pro-democracy movement had grown stronger, Compaore, for a number of 
reasons not related to term limits, had started to lose his tight control of his party and, as a 
result, the National Assembly. No longer enjoying the 75 percent majority in Parliament 
necessary to amend the constitution and wanting to avoid what might be a risky 
referendum, Compaore’s first move was an attempt to establish a Senate, hoping his 
ability to appoint many members of this Senate individually would allow him to secure 
the three-quarters support he needed to amend the Constitution. 
Society’s move in response to this transparent attempt was to hold massive anti-
Senate protests over the following months, which successfully blocked its 
establishment.159 Society’s response was bold once again when in January of 2014, after 
his failure to establish a Senate, Compaore circulated the idea of holding a constitutional 
referendum to amend Article 37. Compaore’s attempts to manipulate the constitution 
only seemed to energize the pro-democracy groups against his mandate extension. 
Over the next few months more activist organizations formed, including the 
influential Collective Anti-Referendum (CAR) initially formed by 365 associations in 
Ouagadougou and then expanding across the country. Some opposition political parties 
formed their own anti-referendum committees. Later in the year, another activist group, 
Front de Resistance Citoyenne (FRC) emerged composed of 24 civil society 
organizations and headed by members of the traditional resistance—“high profile pro-
democracy intellectuals.”160 Inspirational symbols of Sankara began to emerge in 2014 as 
signs with his picture, videos, and his voice playing on loudspeakers rallied protesters, 
many of whom were not yet born at the time of Compaore’s coup against him.161 By this 
time, political opposition and traditional opposition had been revitalized, but the power of 
civil society was in the grassroots pro-democracy movement. 
When it was apparent that Compaore would seek a fifth term, by summer of 2014 
Balai Citoyen and the pro-democracy opposition had been building the momentum 
                                                 




needed to turn out the people. In another assist from Senegal, Y’en a Marre performed 
concerts and took part in conferences and protests in Ouagadougou and Bobo Dioulasso. 
The Burkina Faso version of “Ne touch pas ma constitution” was “Hands off my 
constitution.” Efforts to inform the people about why a constitution mattered and to rally 
support accelerated.162  
G. A TIPPING POINT 
Led by Balai Citoyen and the pro-democracy movement, hundreds of thousands 
crowded into the central square in Ouagadougou during the last week of October 2014. 
They called for Compaore to honor the constitution by not calling for a referendum to 
extend his mandate, characterizing his plan to run for a fifth term as a “constitutional 
coup.”163 They were met with tear gas as they marched. Similar protests occurred in 
Bobo-Dioulasso and in the smaller towns of Koudougou, Ouahigouya, Kaya, Koupela, 
Dori, and others across the country. In line with instructions from Balai Citoyen and other 
groups, these protests were for the most part still peaceful. 
One foreign diplomat, in a 2017 interview, offered an insight into both Compaore 
and the protesters, stating that Compaore did not realize how mad people were. Burkina 
Faso’s streets were overflowing with citizens demanding that he cancel the vote for a 
referendum to extend term limits. However, he was not dissuaded. Dorrie writes, 
“Compaore’s rule was challenged on multiple occasions over the years.”164 He had seen 
mass anger before in the Norbert and Justin Zongo cases and had with force and 
concessions survived it. This time, however, civil society opposition had changed in 
fundamental ways with a grassroots pro-democracy movement now becoming the 
dominant civil society power. Compaore, on the other hand, had not developed new 
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strategies and the old ones were less effective because the pro-democracy sector was not 
interested in concessions. 
The vote was set for October 30.165 For society, the tipping point occurred when 
the country learned that, in a surprise move, Compaore had convinced enough members 
of parliament to support the repeal of term limits and the National Assembly could pass 
the repeal without requiring a subsequent referendum. Le Balai Citoyen, CGD, and other 
civil society groups called for mass protests and, by some counts, as many as a million 
people filled the streets.166 One international observer who wished to remain anonymous 
explained in a 2017 interview, “The Burkina people are patient, but now didn’t believe 
Compaore would ever leave.”167 Angry and confrontational, their call now was for 
Compaore to resign.168 “Blaise dégagé” (Blaise clear out) and “BF = Burkina Faso, pa 
Blaise et Francois” (not Blaise and Francois [his brother]) was shouted and painted on 
walls. Thousands packed the National Assembly and prevented the vote. The 
government’s television network was forced off the air.169  
It was the youth-led Balai Citoyen and CAR that were on the frontline, deciding 
to breach security and torch the National Assembly, and march to the presidential 
palace.170 They also torched the homes of members of parliament from both the 
Compaore regime side and opposition party sides—an illustration of their broad 
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dissatisfaction with government.171 Compaore tried his appeasement strategy—saying 
that he would cancel the vote—but it was too late.172  
Civil society played a role in curtailing violence. Cohen writes that, in the heat of 
rioting, “Civil society mobilized to head off confrontation.”173 Cohen also writes that the 
Burkina Faso Youth League was particularly helpful in working with the military to 
curtail the use of violence against protesters.174 The Army, already having mutinied in 
2011 and seeing the numbers and determination of the protesters, in some cases joined 
with them and in other cases simply let protesters pass.175 Only the RSP used violence to 
protect the palace.176 The next day, the Compaore government was dissolved. Compaore 
resigned and fled the country.  
H. IT REALLY WAS ABOUT THE CONSTITUTION 
Compaore was overthrown by the pro-democracy movement to protect term limits 
and the constitution in Burkina Faso. What happened next illustrates their strength and 
commitment. Following a power struggle among various factions of the Army, Army 
Chief of Staff Isaac Zida was charged with setting up a transition government and 
preparing for elections within a year.177 Ironically, Zida began by suspending the 
Constitution only to walk back that decision in the face of an overwhelming backlash 
from Balai Citoyen and the pro-democratic civil society opposition as well as the 
international community.178 Civil society continued to be involved in the civilian-led 
transition committee formed to establish a government and organize elections. Cohen 
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writes that the Burkina Bar Association facilitated arrangements among opposition 
political parties, the Army and the tribal elders for a transitional citizens’ government to 
run the country during a cooling-off period and prepare for elections.179  
Before the scheduled elections could take place, pro-democracy groups mobilized 
to fill the streets yet again when, in September 2015, the infamous RSP took the 
president, prime-minister, and other ministers of the transition government hostage and 
declared a coup d’état on the national television station. The RSP dissolved the 
government and parliament and removed the interim president. Civil society mobilized in 
anger and Burkina Faso was paralyzed by a general strike. After a devastating week for 
the country, the Army sided with the people and the coup failed. In November 2015, 
elections took place. Roch Kabore, previously a president of the National Assembly who 
had defected from Compaore’s party in January 2014, was elected.180 One foreign 
observer reported that people in authority realize there is a much greater level of public 
accountability now.181 
I. CONCLUSION 
Civil society opposition to Compaore as it would take shape between 2005 and 
2014 was substantially different from what it had been when Compaore first ran for a 
third term. The balance of power within the social opposition shifted from the trade 
unions to the pro-democracy movement and the focus became protecting the constitution 
including respect for term limits. Civil society was strong enough and focused enough in 
2014 to prevent Compaore from extending his mandate.  
Between 2005 and 2014, civil society opposition to Compaore remained 
overwhelmingly urban. The makeup of that opposition changed, however, as a growing 
civil society pro-democracy movement emerged in the city of Ouagadougou and reached 
out to thousands of young internal rural to urban migrants who had recently come to the 
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city of Ouagadougou. Civil society pro-democracy groups such as CGD and Balai 
Citoyen offered what Yarwood has called “a channel for alienated youth to voice their 
frustrations and mobilize politically.”182 
The emergence of effective new civil society groups like CDG and Balai Citoyen 
mattered immensely to the success of the opposition. Their strategy of providing civic 
education about democracy, constitutions, and provisions such as term limits, tailored for 
the less well-educated newly urban youth to help them to connect the dots between long 
tenures in office and abuses such as corruption and impunity was essential to mobilizing 
them in 2014. The groups’ use of analog techniques such as discussion and debate, 
coupled with the time between 2008 and 2013 before they really had to mobilize in mass, 
enabled the pro-democracy movement to start somewhat slowly and build consensus as it 
gained momentum and grew stronger. It appears to have been durable, because after 
Compaore was gone, pro-democracy groups continued to mobilize to protect the 
constitution. 
With regard to other possible sources of influence mentioned in the literature 
review, international and geographical, including the presence of natural resources, 
neither seems likely to have been sufficient to constrain Compaore to respect term limits. 
Compaore often created the appearance of democracy for international observers while 
covertly utilizing tools of repression and patronage.183 Also well-known was his self-
enrichment and enrichment of the elites by taking profits from international aid as well as 
from the countries natural resources such as gold and cotton.184 Given those conditions, it 
appears that the amount of fungible money from international aid and natural resources 
would have strengthened Compaore relative to society. In Burkina Faso, civil society was 
the best and, arguably, the only real option for holding Compaore accountable and 
protecting term limits.  
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IV. LESSONS FROM BURKINA FASO’S OVERTHROW 
OF COMPAORE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The puzzle as to why some African leaders find success in changing their 
country’s constitution to evade term limits and others do not has been the subject of 
academic research, news media attention and concern among both the United States and 
Western governments and the African Union. This study aimed to contribute to the 
solution of that puzzle by identifying societal factors which, in Burkina Faso, constrained 
a president from extending his mandate.  
This concluding chapter will discuss findings regarding changes in society from 
the time of Compaore’s successful mandate extension in 2005 to his overthrow in 2014, 
when mass protests blocked his second attempt at mandate extension. The chapter will 
analyze what implications these findings may have for other African countries whose 
leaders may wish to extend their mandates. Additionally, the chapter will suggest 
possible topics for further investigation and possible implications for the United States 
government as it pursues successful partnerships with African states as well as for others 
interested in promoting democracy. 
B. WHAT CHANGED BETWEEN 2005 AND 2014? 
When Compaore ran for a third term in 2005, society was unable to constrain him 
in that attempt because the power of civil society at that time rested with the trade unions, 
which were inclined toward socialist ideologies. Trade union members were urban and 
formally educated but disconnected from other urban populations that ultimately proved 
instrumental in driving Compaore from power. Additionally, the analysis in Chapter II 
indicates that the human rights and trade union groups were not necessarily interested in 
constitutional issues and regime change. They were content with concessions from the 
regime and their main outstanding preoccupation was with justice surrounding the 
Norbert Zongo killing. 
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What changed by 2014 was the composition and focus of civil society opposition 
to Compaore. Thousands of young, urban migrants formed the core of a new civil society 
movement, ideologically different from what had existed previously because it was pro-
democracy and demographically different because the migrants were newly urban and 
not formally educated. The groups were consciously pro-democratic, spreading messages 
that sought to educate citizens about constitutional issues, and specifically the need to 
maintain term limits under Article 37. By 2014, pro-democracy groups had become the 
dominant power of civil society and successfully mobilized to overthrow Compaore, 
constraining him from extending his mandate for a second time. 
C. HYPOTHESES EVALUATED 
This thesis examined the hypothesis that societal factors can be a key force in 
constraining leaders in their efforts to extend their mandates. In particular, I hypothesized 
that urbanization, civil society development, and education levels could propel an 
opposition in a way that limits a leader’s ability to successfully extend his mandate. My 
investigation of Burkina Faso has revealed that, in 2014, there were additional effective 
constraints on President Compaore’s power, that these constraints came from societal 
factors, and that the specific factors of urbanization and the functioning of civil society 
organizations were particularly influential. The study does not confirm the influence of 
level of formal education. In Burkina Faso, formal education was found to be less 
influential as a determining factor in society’s ability to constrain Compaore’s extension 
of his mandate.  
Urbanization was important because it enabled the synergy between demographic 
changes and the new pro-democracy civil society organizations, which empowered 
Burkinabe society to overthrow Compaore in 2014. While societal opposition to 
Compaore in both 2005 and 2014 was almost entirely urban, by 2014, urban 
demographics had shifted to include the rural to urban migrants. Concurrently, the urban 
pro-democracy movement shifted the ideological focus of societal opposition from 
obtaining concessions and justice to protecting the constitution and, specifically in 2014, 
to protecting term limits.  
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Two particular demographic characteristics of the new urban migrants mattered in 
relation to the hypothesis of this thesis. First, the migrants were young and, as noted by 
Yarwood in the literature review, the demographic of youth is associated with both urban 
dwellers and with support for term limits.185 Second, these young migrants had less 
formal education than members of the opposition prior to 2005. Although the connection 
between higher levels of formal education and support for term limits has been 
documented, again by Yarwood as discussed in the literature review, findings of this 
study indicate that higher levels formal education were not necessarily important to the 
successful mobilization of the migrant population for the protection of term limits.186 In 
short, the case of Burkina Faso suggests that the role of formal education in supporting 
term limits and transfers of power appears to be overstated in the literature. 
Since urbanization, although very important, is structural and formal education 
was not found to be influential, I argue that the factor studied that contributed most to 
society’s ousting of Compaore was the functioning of civil society organizations. 
Specifically, I argue that it was the effective work of new pro-democracy civil society 
organizations, which mobilized newly urban migrants to support adherence to term 
limits, which empowered society to oust Compaore.  
Unlike material concerns or efforts to secure justice for Norbert Zongo, pro-
democracy groups were able to unify diverse interests for a single purpose. They were 
successful in doing this for four reasons. First, they represented a new ideology in civil 
society in Burkina Faso. Second, they attracted new citizens who had not previously been 
politically active. Third, they used methodologies such as outreach and civic education 
which helped to build legitimacy for the movement and to create a pro-democracy 
consensus. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, they provided an opportunity for 
political mobilization.  
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D. POSSIBLE TOPICS FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION 
From this study, five topics emerge that may be worthy of further investigation. 
First, with regard to urbanization, it may be worthwhile to investigate the extent to which 
visible signs of ruling class exigencies helped to mobilize protesters by comparing the 
impact of a capital city such as Ouagadougou with the impact of a large, urban West 
African non-capital city on the success of civil society pro-democracy opposition to a 
leader. Contrasts between the living conditions of government officials and the living 
conditions of ordinary citizens are visible in a capital city, the presidential palace for 
example contrasted with shanty towns on the outskirts of Ouagadougou. To citizens, such 
contrasts may be an indication of government accountability or lack thereof. A study 
comparing the impact of visible inequality between government officials and ordinary 
citizens in a capital city with a city in which the living conditions of government officials 
are not visible would tell us what, if any, impact making such inequality visible has on 
civil society, the pro-democracy movement within society, and the success or failure of 
society in constraining a leader to honor his mandate. 
A second topic for future research may be found in the interaction between civil 
society opposition and opposition politicians. In Burkina Faso, as the civil society pro-
democratic movement grew stronger, weak opposition political parties also began to 
grow marginally stronger and Compaore’s dominant party began to fracture. This appears 
conceptually logical. It might be helpful, however, to discover if this pattern is replicated 
in other countries and, if so, investigate the interaction among these three factors—
strengthening of civil society opposition, strengthening of previously weak political 
opposition, and weakening of the dominant political party. Such a study might have 
implications for civil society to participate in a non-partisan way to help political 
opposition parties put forth candidates or develop platforms where they have not had 
them in the past. This type of cooperation could perhaps mean avoiding the overthrow of 
a leader by making it possible to defeat him through constitutional means. 
A third area has to do with the role of social media. When does sharing on social 
media become beneficial to a movement? For observers looking only at 2013 and 2014 
when the term limits issue in Burkina Faso began to attract widespread attention, it may 
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have appeared that rap, reggae and sharing on social media built the pro-democracy 
movement. In fact, the pro-democracy movement had done significant pro-democracy 
consensus building before it needed to mobilize in the latter half of 2014. While sharing 
on social media contributed much to the success in ousting Compaore in 2014, evidence 
shows, in Egypt for example, that it was not helpful following the ousting of Mubarak. 
As Wael Ghonim explained, “when the euphoria faded…we failed to build consensus and 
social media became a battlefield of misinformation, rumors, and trolls…[which] 
eventually tore us apart.”187 It appears that social media may galvanize a movement and 
help to oust a particular leader, but the desired long-term result, a more accountable, 
fairly elected government, for example, may not happen or may not last. Knowledge of 
when a movement is sufficiently mature to benefit from social media sharing of its ideas 
and events could perhaps be helpful to fledging pro-democratic organizations. 
The fourth topic is to better understand pro-democratic organizations that were 
pivotal in Burkina Faso, such as CDG and Balai Citoyen. As new organizations, they had 
to develop a structure, fund their activities, and build consensus within the organizations 
at the same time they were educating and building pro-democracy consensus among 
citizens. Lessons that might be learned from these two organizations include how to form 
and grow the organization itself as well as how to develop and use the most effective 
methodologies for accomplishing their missions. Such lessons could be valuable to other 
civil society pro-democracy groups in earlier stages of development.  
Finally, it might be useful to investigate what happens to democracy after the 
revolution. The ousting of Compaore succeeded in protecting term limits with regard to 
his administration but not beyond. The first move of the Army transition government put 
into place on the night Compaore fled was to suspend the constitution. Perhaps a truer 
test of society’s ability to protect term limits would be the need, when a leader is 
overthrown rather than defeated by constitutional means, for civil society pro-democracy 
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groups to continue to function to ensure that the constitution and term limits are protected 
in the transition from one leader to the next. 
E. POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT AND OTHER DEMOCRACY PROMOTERS 
The United States government has identified two priorities to which findings of 
this study are relevant: promoting good governance and democracy, including respect for 
term limits, and reducing the threat of violent extremist organizations.188 Both 
undemocratic, unaccountable governments and violent extremist organizations create 
conditions of instability that threaten the strategic interests of the United States.  
In Burkina Faso, a civil society pro-democratic movement addressed both of these 
concerns by constraining a long-term leader’s ability to manipulate the constitution to 
extend his mandate and by providing civic education and mobilizing a large, young 
disenfranchised population of rural to urban migrants to become advocates for democracy 
rather than recruits of a violent extremist group.  
Furthermore, results support a focus on developing local solutions.189 Consistent 
with maximizing these relationships and developing local solutions, the United States and 
other promoters of democracy may find it beneficial to seek unobtrusive ways of 
identifying effective grassroots pro-democratic organizations and, without co-opting, 
assist them in their work. Such action conforms to strategic objective number 4 of the 
Department of State and USAID Joint Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism, May 
2016, which reads, “Empower and amplify locally credible voices that can change the 
perception of violent extremist groups and their ideology among key demographic 
segments.”190 
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Specifically, results of this study indicate that U.S. government resources and 
those of other pro-democratic groups deployed to assist with specific education about 
democracy and pro-democracy consensus building have the likelihood of being sound 
investments. While raising the level of formal education within a society happens over a 
relatively long period, the faster impact of civic education was demonstrated in Burkina 
Faso as, between 2008 and 2014, thousands of citizens who had not previously known 
about democracy or been interested in politics became pro-democracy advocates. Pro-
democratic consensus building was important to developing resilience and the capacity to 
bring about lasting change. Moreover, low-tech tools such as civic education, one-to-one 
or small group conversations, building understanding and trust, were shown to be 
important to pro-democratic consensus building. This study supports the U.S. 
government’s encouragement and demonstration of the uses of such tools. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The experience of Burkina Faso demonstrated that when President Compaore 
manipulated political institutions, the civil society pro-democracy movement, empowered 
by increases in the urban population, could hold him accountable and constrain his ability 
to succeed by using the tool they had—mass protests. Not only could civil society 
constrain Compaore, it was required to do so; demands for accountability cannot come 
from weak, fractured, and unrepresentative opposition political parties. While a popular 
movement was not a substitute for constitutional constraints or electoral competition, it 
did fill that void by holding Compaore accountable and protecting constitutional term 
limits, if only against him individually.  
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